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Analysis of The Northeast Asia Approach toward Korean Peninsula
Security Environment of Korean Peninsula



As is already know to the world, the division of Korea, as in the case of Germany, was the result of the ill-coordinated division of work between the United States and the Soviet Union in their war time effort to defeat the common enemy, the Nazi Germany and the Militant Japan, which soon developed into Cold War through mutual suspicion and fear, immediately after the disappearance of their common enemy.

The out break of overall warfare in Korean peninsula, of which the challenge was the north communist, was promoted most of all by the U.S. government's manifestation of pulling out its force from the Korean peninsula and the exemption of the territory from its primary defensive perimeter. The outrageous invasion, however, was repulsed by the united efforts on the part of the U.S. side.

In fact, The world faces up to the historical changes of strategic surroundings and, after the liberalization of East block and end of cold war era with the past USSR disrupted, The order of international politics centered on policy and ideology, so called "Geopolitical order" turns to new "Geoeconomical order" Centered on economic benefits.

Thus, while the possibility of large war reduces including nuclear weapon by the logic of cold war, the possibility of regional conflicts like a low-intensity conflict by the nationalism, religion and territory problem becomes larger.

Despited of the worldwide tendency like those, the end of cold war era, arms control and so forth, East-Asian nations accelerate military build-up in the new formation course of planning for supremacy with the power vacuum from neiboring strong powers to lesser powers, and in Northeast Asia's case, military build-up to fight potential supremacy between Japan and China is attracted public attention.

For example, in the past time when the military blocks of the world were controlled by two super powers, U.S. and USSR, Japan's reinforcement of military power was not thought as a threat but thought just as a matter of concern. But now days when new world order is being made, the fact that Japan's reinforcement of military power which is based on its great economic power, sound national traits, continuous development of hi-technique, and capability of having nuclear weapons makes us feel a kind of serious threat. Because Japan's dispatch of military force to oversea and reinforcement of military power caused escalation confrontation of neighbor countries, new order is being made now.

Japan has had so much friction with the continent because of its geopolitical potion. But under the security-umbrella of USA, Japan has become an economic super power with advocation a slogan of "The Grand Asia Co-Prosperity". And in working out plan to enforcement of military force to keep its national interest, Japan has been as cautious and circumspect as could be.

 The evidences of Japan's military power building came from reorganization of The Self-Defense Force and reinforcement of equipment. The major reasons of Japan's military power building are to secure the line of resources supply, to protect overseas properties, and to meet the pressure of security responsibility-share asked by U.S.

  Specially, Japan continually drives forward military increasing based on enormous economic strength and high-tech. Simultaneously, It has no doubted that we need to Cope with those trends positively and actually that enlarge military influence power within Japanese area, when we consider Japan is our friendly nation and also potential influence power.

In recent times, China has repeatedly emphasized that the Chinese approach to the question of Korea proceeds from asking whether a policy is conducive to stability and peace on the Korean peninsula and to the peaceful, independent reunification of Korea. China seemed to behave in accordance with such a declaratory policy on the Korean question. Because China's opposition to international terrorism is unequivocal, Chinese officials should communicate to Pyongyang that the United States and South Korea are concerned about North Korea's prudent behavior in the future. But China did not cooperate with the United States, and justified China's position, saying that UN Security Council consideration of this question could only lead to the intensification of the tense atmosphere between the two parts of Korea.

 Because, this essay reviews primarily the nature of U.S.-China security relations in a historical context, focusing on the major components of security relations like strategic consultation, functional military ties, technology and arms transfer, and intelligence gathering. Secondly, this essay explores whether the linkage between U.S. arms transfers to China and China's support for U.S. security objectives in the Asia-Pacific region has existed, and, if any, what the nature of the linkage is and what it means to the Korean peninsula. Thirdly, this essay discusses the international implications of Chinese military modernization in general, and its future impact on the military balance on the Korean peninsula. Finally, this essay will suggest policy implications for the United States and the Republic of Korea in view of the evolving nature of U.S.-Chinese security cooperation.

Nevertheless whether the new Asian policy of the United States as this will be maintained or undergo some substantial change denies any supposition at the present.

  So far, Russia has an anxiety about the reduction of influence power with the decline of military power in Russia and the most positive position in the composition of multilateral security cooperation system in order to cooperate with economic developed countries.

  North Korea stick to a position of objection because of anxiety of system's demolition with it opened but is placed in the more tender position than it used to be considering international isolation and the withdrawal of American military forces stationed in Korea.

  Now, it is very important to analysis multilateral security cooperation effect in the view of the regional characteristics and security environment. In the future, it will give significant meanings to the process of security and unification policy in the korean peninsula.

  Korea has preferred military alliance with U.S. but is positive in Northeast Asia SCS lately for opening of North Korea and preventing Japan and China to be more influence.

  And spreading of reconciliation mood according to end of cold war, weakening the mutual alliance, increasing of economical burden with competition of military funds make it more needful Northeast Asia- SCS.

  So, we must compose SCS joning the six Northeast Asia countries and set the peace to acquire regional stability.

Analysis of The Northeast Asia Approach toward Korean Peninsula

1) Forecast of change in the US & Japan security system

Japan, that had traditionally pursued the closed door policy, began to open itself to the world by the mid-19th century. Its armed forces were organized, with the conscription system in 1873. Thereafter, Japan defeated the Chinese and Russian armed forces at the 1884 Ching-Japan War and 1905 Russia-Japan War respectively.

  Having gained a strong self-confidence in its own military power, Japan eventually triggered the World War II. However, its total defeat in the War led to its aversion to war and self-repentance of the penetrative war. Since then, Japan under the US security umbrella has maintained substantial armed forces in the name of self-defense.  

The principal guideline of Japan's security policy is based on the decision of the First KISHI Cabinet in May 1957. The objective of its security policy is to actively support the UN activities for the world peace and stability and also to contribute to the realization of the world peace through close international cooperation.  

Under such objectives, Japan's security policy is composed of six principles : (1) planning for gradual forces improvement, (2) adherence to the three principles of denuclearization, (3) the establishment of the 'Exclusive Defense-Oriented Policy' stipulated on the Peace Constitution, (4) making efforts for the improvement of defence forces based on the national consensus, (5) the pursuit of the defence strategy based on the US-Japan security system, and (6) the development of total defense Based on such policy objectives and principles, Japan has made a series of defense plans. In October 1976 it finalized the basic guideline of defense planning at the Legislature and Cabinet Meeting.

As the result of increasingly and continually propelled Japanese military build-up, traditional defense conception turns into regional defense from its own's defense, more and more, someone seems to know the facts that Japan enters into a stage searching after worldwide military role.

  The reason the fact is very persuasive : all sorts of Japanese home and abroad factors, a current series of security relation movements and so on. Above all, As we look at Japanese domestic factors, It is important for Japan to ensure a source of stable material supply owing to lack of material as an actual circumstance that economic growth without abroad materials is impossible, and National protection policies are inevitable due to throughly protect enormous abroad capitals, and Japan also adheres strictly to the need of military Augmentation, As both a role within the region and the pressure of responsibility assignment are increasingly enlarged and immediately the capability of all-weather war industry is inputted in order to product arms of equipments.

  On the other hand, external factors can be evaluated as making Japanese justice rationalize for military augmentation due to the threat of Russia which is still considered a potential enemy, the pursuit to enlarge chinese influence power toward the ocean, current north korean medium distance missiles and nuclear threat. According to those factors, we can prove that Japan pursues military supremacy which trandends the limitation of self-defense power : The PKO dispatch of forces' enlargement, the amendment of the constitution's movements, the insurance of military power for 1,000 knot defense, the nuclear development to construct the nuclear fuel product system for the nuclear armaments and the fifth new middle defense planning to ensure the new generation up-to-date arms system.  

The Shortest distance nation, The revised military orbit of Japan has an effect on Korean security directly and indirectly, forms the security directly and indirectly, forms the security cooperative system with South Korea, the united states and Japan, and has effectiveness of restraint against China and the insurance of a searoad toward the East-pacific. That is, There are so many differant positive sides, on the other hand, When Japan is transfigured as a military super power, Our concerns are centered on negative sides : The increase of security threat by the result of armaments race within regional nations and the security disproportion. Now, with the end of the Cold War, Japan fully recognizes that the territorial expansionism as in the colonial era is no longer feasible, and that almost all the political objectives could be fulfilled with economic power. Also, it has strengthened the military power on a continual basis, with a recognition that military power plays an important role in complementing the limits of the economic power. As part of it Japan, based on the people's agreement, recently makes an attempt at dispatching its self-defense forces abroad under "with Japan" just as Japan has used "with U.S." policy throughly.

  U.S. Japan ties, secured by trust and mutual respect rather than an anachronistic and unequal security treaty, must be the corner stone of any new structure.

  Few can doubt that the strength of U.S.-Japan ties will be the key to security and prosperity in the Pacific region well into the next century. Yet relations are dangerously strained by a politically unsustainable trade gap and high-technology rivalry with major strategic implications. Without the Soviet Union as a "reliable enemy," a prime source of solidarity will be gone and their alliance more than ever in need of a new rationale. Coming at a time when both countries are taking a fresh, critical look at each other, no one can be confident that economic interdependence and burden sharing proposals however logical and carefully thought through-will succeed in indefinitely gluing things together. Unless put on a post-Cold War footing, relations will rest uneasily on a political faultline, waiting, San Francisco-style, for the "big one" to wreak its havoc.

Nor is it only that dangerous pressures are building in U.S.-Japan relations ; opportunities are also emerging. "We are entering a world," Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Solomon, recently commented, "in which economic strength and technological prowess, not just military capability, are the sinews of national power ; a world in which geo-economics is a key force shaping geo-politics." In such a world, it will be argued, both Washington and Tokyo need a different relationship to that enshrined in the present treaty if they are to cement a durable partnership in pursuit of a common interest in peace and prosperity in the Pacific.  

Granted, the stormy times generated by the treaty in the past and the, Pandora's box its review could open are good grounds for proceeding with the utmost caution. Moreover, East Asia's security environment is different and more complex to that of Europe's. Arms control, though no less important, will be difficult to pursue. However, existing U.S.-Japan treaty arrangements have largely achieved their Cold War goal of containing Soviet military expansion in the Pacific. Prolonging them too far into the future in their present form, as the character of U.S.-Japan relations changes and tensions grow, risks defeating their other purpose of keeping Japan from "going it alone" as a major autonomous military power. This would destabilize the region and could nurture the reemergence of Japanese militarism.  

Moreover, East Asia beyond the Cold War should open new options for Japan, including that of a reaffirmation of the peace constitution and the non-nuclear principles in the context of greater military autonomy and self-reliance. The framework of existing U.S.-Japan security relations, in particular the nuclear umbrella, could remain; what would change would be the inner balance and dynamic, making Japan responsible and fully accountable for its conventional self- defence force structure, step by step in parallel with wider super power and multilateral confidence building measures and arms control agreements in the region. In the process, the cost of Japan's conventional self-defence would settle on Japanese shoulders where it properly belongs.  

In their controversial pamphlet, The Japan that Can Say "No", Messrs. Morita and Ishihara(1989) touch the core of what could mortally damage U.S.-Japan ties-mistrust and a lack of mutual respect. Messrs. Morita and Ishihara know very well that Tokyo has rarely lacked the ability to say "No" to Washington in its own indirect style, be it in defence, trade or other fields. The present security treaty itself testifies to the stolid resistance of most Japanese, over the past four decades, to accepting an American view of the world and Japan's place and role in that world. Senator Nunn implicity acknowledges this in questioning whether "either our country or the Japanese understand fully the views of the other" or have "a different perception of the threat," adding that the Japanese may "feel that they themselves are doing more than we credit them for doing."

2) The Evolution of US-China Security

This essay reviews primarily the nature of U.S.-China security relations in a historical context, focusing on the major components of security relations like strategic consultation, functional military ties, technology and arms transfer, and intelligence gathering. Secondly, this essay explores whether the linkage between U.S. arms transfers to China and China's support for U.S. security objectives in the Asia-Pacific region has existed, and, if any, what the nature of the linkage is and what it means to the Korean peninsula. Thirdly, this essay discusses the international implications of Chinese military modernization in general, and its future impact on the military balance on the Korean peninsula. Finally, this essay will suggest policy implications for the United States and the Republic of Korea in view of the evolving nature of U.S.-Chinese security cooperation.  

The sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s created an opportunity for two states to reach a tacit understanding of their counterpart's prospective security objectives in the Asia-Pacific region and especially on the Korean peninsula. This understanding could help the two sides redesign their strategic thinking and planning in the region. A largescale pullback of American forces from Vietnam and throughout East Asia, and redesign of U.S. strategy from a "two and half war" strategy to a "one and half war" strategy, were derived partly from the increasing sino-American reconciliation. In a talk with Mao Zedong in 1972, President Nixon expressed the American intention not to pose a threat to China. In response, Mao assured Nixon that China would not threaten Japan and South Korea.  

However, the statements concerning the Korean peninsula that appeared in the Nixon-Zhou Shanghai communique indicated that the United States and China would have different interests and policies on the Korean problem. For the first time after the Korean War, the United States and China had consulted and tried to clarify that the two countries have parallel strategic interests and policies, and that they would significantly differ over the Korean problem. This security consultation between the two countries soon appeared to be reinforced during the time of the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, when the United States and China shared a mounting threat perception of the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

. Just before China entered the war with Vietnam, which had become a formal ally in early November 1978, China seemed to seek a strategic alignment with the United States, providing Washington with information on its limited security objectives and scope of its operation. During his visits to Washington and Tokyo in January and February of 1979, Deng Xiaoping was reported to criticize publicly Soviet hegemonism. Later, in August, Vice President Walter Mondale echoed Deng, saying that any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate China assumes "a stance counter to American interests."

  The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 further added to the necessity of security coordination between the two countries. By then the two countries found easily what their parallel interests were on regional and global security issues, but would not agree with the scope and means for security cooperation.

  Leaders in Beijing would neither seek a formal alliance, nor were they eager to participate in a highly coordinated defense strategy which could actively facilitate the role and mission of American forces in responding to threatening Soviet military actions. Rather they wanted to build a united front, meaning that each state should commit to inform the other of the scope and objectives of its security policies, and should recognize the need to coordinate activities and support one another on matters of mutual concern. They of course included U.S. arms sales and technology transfer to China in their calculation of security cooperation.

  The U.S. policy toward China was based on the premises that antagonism between Beijing and Moscow would continue to exist, and in the long run a secure and strong China would conform to U.S. security interests and could be the foundation for stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Leaders in Washington would not want to enter an alliance with Beijing, but make it an agreeable partner in U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy, and U.S. golbal strategy, if possible. In this context the United States considered major components of U.S.-China security cooperation to be (1) strategic consultation or coordination, focusing on a mutual examination of the global strategic situation and exchanges of each others' intentions and plans, just short of planning together ; (2) Sino-American collaboration and facilitation, including joint actions to such regional security issues as the Afghanistan problem, the Cambodian issue, and the Korean question as well as the Chinese assistance for U.S. military roles and missions in the Pacific, especially in intelligence collection and logistical assistance; and (3) the transfer of U.S. arms and defense related technology to China.

. In 1980, soon after the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, sino-American security cooperation appeared to develop in various areas. Both countries had consulted and coordinated over the issues with regard to U.S. and China's military support for Pakistan, to the Afghanistan rebels, and to Thailand. During his visit to Beijing in January 1980, Defense Secretary Brown was reported to suggest that another Chinese war to teach Vietnam a lesson would be welcomed by the United States, if Vietnam began to launch a major military attack on Thailand. But Washington and Beijing had different views on the kind of resistance groups in Cambodia assisted by them. While the United States preferred to support the noncommunist Cambodian resistance, China reserved most of its military support for the communist Khmer Rouge. These policies have been consistent until recently.

  Washington and Beijing agreed to install in Sinjiang an electronic intelligence monitoring system and to share the information about Soviet activities in Central Asia. But China reportedly refused a proposal demanded by Brown over emergency American overflights with military supplies for Pakistan. In April 1980, the Carter Administration promoted China from Category "Y" to Category "P" along with nations friendly to the United States. This "P" classification allowed Beijing to purchase such dual use technology and military support equipment as radar, communication equipment, interception equipment and computers on a case-by-case basis, but it still excluded the sale of lethal arms to China. In May, Chinese Defense Minister Geng Biao provided the administration with a "wish list" of 52 items and defense technologies, including some lethal military equipment. In September, in coordinating Chinese preferred items the U.S. government seemed to reach a final approval of about 400 export licenses for various dual use items and military support equipment, but excluding from the list tanks, combat aircraft, and anti-tank weaponry which were all items of Chinese interest.

  Of particular importance is the U.S. defense official' recommendation that the Chinese foremost need be to rebuild their technical infra-structure, especially in the non-defense area in order to benefit from a gradual infusion of sophisticated American defense technology. Indeed, this recommendation, which China appeared to take into consideration in its modernization programmes, would direct China to place the first priority of the PLA's modernization on reforming its force structure and to deemphasize a quick fix of its weapons systems. Initial Security Consultation Assessment, and Prospects, about has "Three Point" Implications.

(1)Strained Security Cooperation

For almost two years prior to the signing of the August 1982 communique, a meaningful U.S.-China security cooperation came to a halt mainly due to the question of continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and the Reagan administration's downgrading of the Chinese role and Capability as a Counterweight to the Soviet Union in the wake of post-Afghanistan developments. Beijing had also begun to pursue an "independent" foreign policy line, to move away from its past anti-Soviet posture, and to explore the possibilities for limited detente with Moscow. Leaders in Beijing had a growing suspicion of the credibility of the U.S.'s commitment to China's modernization, and of a possibility for leaders in Washington to intervene in Chinese internal affairs. More importantly, the Chinese seemed to believe that facing the situation of technical deficiency and financial shortage, China should subordinate military modernization to economic development and should reform the structure of the People's Liberation Army before attempting to modernize it.

  The August communique which had been agreed to and issued, after protracted and difficult negotiations, and pave the way to eliminate obstacles to the development of U.S.-China security cooperation. In that communique, China reaffirmed its intention to seek a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem. The United States formally agreed to reduce gradually it sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over time to a final solution. The period of two years only saw one important U.S. decision to relax its restrictions on arms sales to Beijing. In June 1981 when Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China, the Reagan administration announced its decision to sell lethal weapons to China only on a case by case basis. The United States had not promoted China to "V" classification, which was only formally granted to Washington's allies and friends in Western Europe, until June 1983 when China came to an agreement on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. From 1983 on, the total value of Chinese purchases of dual-use technology began to increase from $ 350 million in 1982 to about $ 1 billion in 1983 and $ 1.2 billion in 1984.

  It is worth nothing that a linkage between the strained Sino- American security cooperation, Chinese criticism of American hegemonism, and U.S. and japanese policy in North-east Asia existed over the period. The chinese media had criticized the U.S.-Japan security treaty and Nakasone's pledge of economic aid to South Korea, saying that the pledge would not be beneficial to the stability of the Korean peninsula. The Chinese press condemned the United States for the Team Spirit military exercise and even suggested that China was no longer prepared to consider the U.S. forces on the peninsula as a stabilizing factor.

  The United States was not willing to induce leaders in Taiwan to start a dialogue with Beijing leaders, while China was not even prepared to edge into the role of mediator on the Korean question and still showed increasing sensitivity to having contacts and trade with South Korea.

(2) Expanded Functional Exchanges and Arms Sales

The September 1983 visit to China by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger contributed to a revival of mutual trust and the resumption of U.S.-China military cooperation. After Weinberger's visit, Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping's trip to Washington in 1984 led to establish the pattern of reciprocal visits between senior defense officials and military leaders. In addition, the two countries agreed to expand functional service to service exchange. These exchanges included not only visits by commanders and members of each country's military units and functional organizations to counterpart units and organizations, but also ship visits and visits by various demonstration teams and entertainment groups. It can be understood that the primary objective of reciprocal high-level exchange visits is to increase security consultation by fostering mutual understanding through the exchange of views on regional and global security issues. Functional military exchanges are aimed at helping greater numbers of military personnel to learn about the other country and to exchange information in their functional specialties. Such exchanges, according to a U.S. defense official, contributed to ensure that future generations of U.S. and Chinese leaders will share some common frame of reference.

  In June 1984, two months after his visit to Beijing, President Reagan issued a formal policy determination that the sale of U.S. weapons to China would strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace, thereby clearing the way for Beijing to make government-to-government purchases under the foreign Military Sales Program. The two countries signed their government-to- government arms sales contract in September 1985. The contract was worth $98 million, for artillery shell technology. In addition, the Chinese purchased, through commercial channels, from the United States 24 S70C2 helicopters for its army in 1984 and five General Electric LM gas turbine engines for naval ships in 1985, which would enable China to build a larger and more powerful warship to sail the blue waters.

  A most controversial issue of U.S. arms sales of China in 1986 was the sale of $550 million worth of avionics equipment to upgrade China's F-8 interceptor aircraft. The sales program would require about six years to complete and was an item sale, not involving co-assembly or co-production. nevertheless, the program could contribute to turn the F-8 interceptor into an all-weather one, and be equipped with technical modules comparable to those in F-16 fighters in the electronic systems. In September 1987, a year after the sales contract was made, four F-16 jets of the American Air Force Thunderbirds showed their aerial skills at Nanyuan Air Base on the outskirts of Beijing. Air Force Secretary Edward Abridge, Jr., who watched the demonstration, together with China's Air Force Commander Wang Hai, told reporters that the U.S. air force will be sending teams to China to work with the Chinese air force to establish a training and maintenance program to go along with the new technology.

In May 1986, the U.S. Congress approved the program after a heated debate. James Lilly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1986 that the modest upgrade of the Chinese F-8 interceptor would not alter the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and further stressed U.S. arms sales policy as the followings : "The willingness of the U.S. to sell specific defensive weapons or technologies to the PRC is based on a thorough analysis of each item's utility for enhancing Chinese defensive capabilities, taking into full consideration the political-military environment and the interests and concerns of our other friends and allies in the region."

  For Reagan administration aides, a major consideration for the United States in Approving arms sales to China was the desire to help improve China's ability to counter the soviet Union and to prevent a further widening of the capabilities gap between China and the Soviet Union, which Washington viewed as a potentially destabilizing factor in the Northeast Asia.

  In the years of 1983 to 1985, however, U.S. arms and technology sales to Beijing did not generate Chinese positive behavior and close Sino-American collaboration in dealing with international issues. The shooting down by Soviet military aircraft of a South Korean civilian airline over Sakhalin island north of Japan on September 1, 1983, apparently reinforced the Pentagon's conviction that the Soviets were increasingly powerful and dangerous in that area. During his talks in China, Weinberger repeatedly stressed his view that the United States and China be "united in facing a major threat from the Soviet Union" and suggested that the whole ability to deter war and maintain peace would be greatly increased if the United States could strengthen China in ways they want to be strengthened. But the Chinese did not publicly endorse that view and favored a literally nonaligned position in dealing with Washington and Moscow. It is notable that at the United Nations Security Council, China abstained on a resolution condemning Russia for shooting down the Korean airliner. During their meeting with Deng Xiaoping in August 1985, seven U.S. senators denounced China was carrying out "a two U.S. policy," working closely with Washington on bilateral issues, but opposing it in public, as at the United Nations. The delegation showed that China voted with the Soviet Union 86% of the time in 1984 and with the United States 14% of the time on issues that found the superpowers on opposite sides. According to them, in particular, China repeatedly supported "name calling" resolutions attacking the United States. A case in point, they cited, was the claim that the United States was in collusion with South Africa's nuclear program.

  China remained unsatisfied with the U.S. arms deal with Taiwan and with the alleged U.S. creation of two Chinas in ways to help the establishment of an official or semi-official status of Taiwan in the international arena. For instance, Han Xu, the PRC's Ambassador to the United States, complained publicly in June 1985 that 760 million dollars worth of arms to Taiwan being sold by the United States in 1985, a cut of a mere 20 million dollars per year which breached the spirit of a 1982 communique in which Washington undertook to gradually reduce such sales. "By this speed," Han Xu ridiculed, "it would take 36 years more, "and" the speed is too slow.

  It is equally notable that the United States could get neither verbal commitment nor written agreement from China not to transfer defense related technology to third countries. When he visited China in 1983, Weinberger continued to seek assurances that China will not pass technological secrets to third countries like North Korea. But Chinese officials objected to aspect of such commitments. American officials were reported to say the matter will be likely to be resolved in future talks. But there is no considerable evidence that the United States has since won such a guarantee from China, and Washington will not do so in the future. As Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and other Chinese leaders have repeatedly claimed, it is Beijing's consistent policy that China will not barter away its sovereign rights and never yield to pressure from and big power.

A remarkable change of Chinese attitude toward the Korean peninsula was made when Deng Xiaoping indicated to Weinberger that China was prepared to play a role, along with the United States, to ease tension on the Peninsula. On October 8, 1983, one day before the Rangoon bombing, China notified the U.S. Embassy in Beijing that North Korea was ready to take part in tripartite talks. In January 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang passed to President Reagan Pyongyang's formal proposal for tripartite talks. Since then the Chinese have been willing to play the so-called sidelines role, not a prominent role, probably transmitting messages and offering suggestions with respect to ways of relaxing tension on the Peninsula and of entering into talks for peaceful unification.

  The Rangoon bombing reportedly embarrassed Deng Xiaoping himself, and he seemed inclined to take a neutral stand on the incident, sending Pyongyang a signal that China will be in a firm position not to support North Korea in case that North Korea may unilaterally create tension and renew hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

  Nevertheless, China showed a cautious attitude toward its future approach to South Korea. In an interview in November 1984, Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang was quoted as saying that the future development of Chinese and South Korean ties, especially direct economic ties, would depend on how situations develop between South Korea and North Korea, suggesting that Chinese policy toward South Korea would not be pursued without Beijing's consideration of an environment conducive to peace and stability on the Peninsula.

  It is not a concidence that China's growing participation in the Korean problem and China's increasing expectation of the united States to Play a role in the Taiwan problem took place during the same period of the time. Beginning in 1985, the Chinese continued to draw the United States to play the role in bringing leaders in Taiwan to Beijing's overtures for formal talks about the three links (trade, visits, and communications) across the Taiwan Strait. In early 1985, Deng Xiaoping sent a message through British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan, expecting that President Reagan could do something on the Taiwan question, but he did not receive a favorable response.

(3) The Port Call and the Issue of China's Arms Sales

During the period from November 1986 of a American fleet call to Qingdao, to September 1988 of U.S. Defense Secretary Carlucci's visit to Beijing, Sino-American security relations smoothly developed, and the two countries overcame through dialogue a difficulty derived from China's arms sales to Middle East countries. In January 1986, the U.S. and Chinese navies held their first operational contacts in the South China Sea. After long discussions between the two sides's leaders, and with twists and turns, a U.S. fleet composed of a guided-missile cruiser, a destroyer, and a guided-missile frigate paid a call to Qingdao on November 5, 1986, for the first time since 1949. Although it was allegedly a courtesy call, and although Weinberger denied, it was "meant to send a signal to anyone." the port call was not only an indication of enhanced naval cooperation, but also intended to send a political signal to the two sides' potential enemies.

  First of all, the port call might have an implication conducive to U.S. long-term strategic interests in defending Japan and during future Sino-U.S. confrontations in the Asia-Pacific theater. U.S. commitment to broaden its defense obligation to Japan should include at least some portion of the maritime defense of China, and thus word require American naval collaboration with the Chinese navy. In particular, according to the Reagan administration's view, the resulting U.S. force deficiencies in Northeast Asia, coupled with the absence of Beijing's participation in an Asia-Pacific regional coalition, not only would lead to Soviet intimidation of China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and even the ASEAN states, also could make the region more vulnerable to future Soviet offshore power projections.

  Secondly, the presence of the American fleet in Qingdao, in Washington's view, would serve as a signal to the Soviet Union in the global contest between the superpowers. One day after the port call, during a press conference Admiral Lyons, Jr., Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet recalled that the Soviet Navy's Pacific fleet based in Vladivostok grew rapidly and recently gained visiting privileges only a few hundred miles north of Qingdao at the North Korean port of Nampo, and Soviet bombers began to make simulated bombing runs off the China coast from airfields in North Korea, and that the Soviets continued to expand their own basing activities at Cam Ranh Bay and at Danang. The commander stressed that the aggressive Soviet actions over the Yellow Sea and into the South China Sea help to define the need for further cooperation between Chinese and American military of officials.

  The scope and frequency of both high level visits and functional interaction had increased by the end of 1987. Yang Tezhi, Chinese Chief of the General Staff, visited Washington in May 1986. Weinberger visited again Beijing in October 1986, and in November, John Wickham, the U.S. Army chief of Staff, visited China. In 1987 alone, P.X. Kelly, commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps traveled China in March, and Chinese Air Force Commander Wang Hai visited the United States in April. Vice Admiral N. R. Thunman, Chief of the Education and Training commandant of the U.S. Navy, arrived at Beijing in April, and Zhang Zhen, President of the National Defense University of China visited his counterpart in the United States in May. The exchange visits reached a peak in May when Yang Shangkun, who was Vice Chairman of CPC Central Military Commission and was in charge of the day-to-day work of China's military affairs, visited the United States. With Yang were Fan Yi, states counsellor in charge of scientific and technical work, Deng Henggao, Minister of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, and Xu Xin, deputy chief of general staff of the PLA. The composition of the Chinese delegation suggested that Sino-U.S. Military technology exchanges would be the most important subject of the visit.

Despite high level visits and functional exchanges, Sino-American security relations had been somewhat strained over intelligence reports of Chinese arms sales to Iran and other Middle East countries. China has reportedly signed agreements to supply 3.1 billion dollars worth of arms to Iran since 1985 and China provided Iran with 440 tanks in 1985 and 1986. In particular, the Americans became sensitive to Chinese sales of silkworm surface-to-surface missiles to Iran, at the very time in 1987 when an enlarged American naval force patrolled the Persian Gulf. The United States was determined to redouble diplomatic efforts to persuade China to halt arms sales to Iran.

  In October 1987, in an effort to increase pressure in China, the Reagan Administration halted an interdepartmental review of computers, electronic equipment and other high technology items that were to be cleared for export to China. But this restriction was modest, so that no cutback in permitted exports was made and only a proposed expansion was suspended. The last shipment of missiles that the United States detected arrived in Iran in late December 1987 or early January 1988 aboard a ship from North Korea. It was soon found that those missiles had not represented a continuing policy of sales, but been sent under an old contract. In February 1988, the U.S. Congress cut off the flow of technology to Beijing. Probably for this reason, China's Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian visited Washington in early March 1988 and had several rounds of talks with American leaders like State Secretary shultz, secretary of Commerce Verity, and Secretary of Defense Carlucci.

  Wefinally convinced the Reagan Administration to resume the flow of high-technology equipment to China, but seemed to have paid a price for the concession, giving China's support to a wordwide arms embargo against Iran.

  The issue was again raised and discussed in September 1988 when Secretary of defense Carlucci met with Chinese leaders. In a meeting, Carlucci expressed concern about rumors on future Chinese sales of missiles to Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, which could pose a potential threat to the balance of power in the Middle East. But, Carlucci told reporters that he was satisfied with Chinese assurances that it would act responsibly when it sells missiles abroad. He added that he hoped the issue now be shelved. Carlucci's satisfaction apparently led the United States to expand its arms sales to China. U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Armitage, who accompanied Carlucci, disclosed the U.S. pledge to provide China with antitank helicopters, antisubmarine torpedoes and radar system. In addition, the Reagan administration has been considering granting a licence for the sale of commercial satellites to China to launch abroad Long March rockets. The Chinese are interested in buying a dozen Chinook military helicopters worth about $ 180 million, which is meant to be one of Beijing's largest direct military purchases from the United States. Chinooks are medium-lift troop transport helicopters that can also move artillery and heavy engineering equipment.

  In the period, another sign of growing security cooperation was U.S.-Chinese collaboration for gathering intelligence about Soviet nuclear tests. Some American government experts have long been interested in establishing a way to monitor Soviet nuclear tests from China because of the need to determine whether the Soviet Union is complying with two treaties from the 1970's that set a limit of 150 kilotons for underground nuclear explosions. But China has resisted overt efforts at gathering intelligence about Soviet blasts. In 1986 China and the United States reportedly completed nine monitoring stations, two of them are in Urumqi and Manchuria, which will allow the United States to make more precise estimates of Soviet tests, in addition to studying and predicting earthquakes.

  During the period, closer bilateral security relations led the two sides to consult frequently on the taiwan issue and the Korean question. In his interview with CBS reporter in September 1986, Deng Xiaoping again expressed his expectation for President Reagan to do "something on the issue" of the reunification of China. In response, Secretary of State Shultz revealed a positive view on the issue in March 1987, when he visited Beijing, and a year later in March 1988, President Reagan also reaffirmed a U.S. willingness to foster the development of the contacts between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The role that the United States should play for the achievement of this objective remains unknown. But Taiwan has recently announced the lifting from November 1, 1987, of a ban on visits to China for people with relatives on the mainland, and winked at trade, hinting that the Kuomintang government is prepared to edge toward reconciliation with the Beijing government without abandoning the 'three nos.'

  The United states also intended to confer on China an intermediary role on the Korean peninsula. On March 9, 1987, the State Department announced that U.S. government relaxed restrictions on its contacts with North Korea, allowing conversations held between U.S. and North Korean diplomats in Neutral areas. In response, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on 19 March welcomed this move. The United States communicated through Beijing's good offices a detailed proposal to North Korea for the improvement of relations, when Shultz visited China in March. Prior to asking China to convey the message, the American government consulted with the South Korean government over the U.S. overture, but Japan was reportedly uninformed. Leaders in Beijing apparently believe that their position in Pyongyang could improve if it is successful at bringing about a dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. But the Beijing government would be willing to convert not any message to Pyongyang, but a selective one, even though Washington wants it to do so.    

In recent times, China has repeatedly emphasized that the Chinese approach to the question of Korea proceeds from asking whether a policy is conducive to stability and peace on the Korean peninsula and to the peaceful, independent reunification of Korea. China seemed to behave in accordance with such a declaratory policy on the Korean question. Because China's opposition to international terrorism is unequivocal, Chinese officials should communicate to Pyongyang that the United States and South Korea are concerned about North Korea's prudent behavior in the future. But China did not cooperate with the United States, and justified China's position, saying that UN Security Council consideration of this question could only lead to the intensification of the tense atmosphere between the two parts of Korea.

Therefore, the discussion so far leads to summarize the main characteristics of U.S.-China security relations as the following.

  First, the underlying premise motivating sino-American security ties has been "parallel interests" primarily derived from their shared threat perception of the Soviet Union. Equally important are China's need for American technology and capital for China's military modernization, and America's need to keep China pointing westward in its market-oriented economic reforms and in its foreign policy.

  Secondly, despite the twists and turns, from the 1970s on U.S.-China security relations have steadily developed, and a series of exchanges and cooperation have been instituted. The major components of two countries' security ties include (1) strategic consultation of coordination, focusing on a mutual examination of the global strategic situation and on exchanges of each other's intentions and plans, but short of joint planning ; (2) Sino-American collaboration for joint action with regard to such regional security issues as the Afghanistan problem, the Cambodian issue as well as the Korean question, and their facilitation of intelligence gathering and sharing ; (3) the expansion of functional service-to-service exchanges, including exchanges of high level military personnel, ship visits, and visits by various demonstration teams and entertainment groups.

Thirdly, the United States has continued to provide China with arms and defense related technology either on a government-to- government basis or through commercial channels, and to lift restriction on sales of arms and technology to China, promoting it to "V" classification which was formally only granted to U.S. allies and friends in Western Europe. China is gradually allowed to purchase sophisticated weapons systems, modernizing naval ship with powerful LM gas turbine engines, upgrading F-8 interceptors, and increasing the mobility of ground forces with U.S. Chinook military helicopters, etc.

  This process has been delayed by the ramification of the June Crackdown, but should continue in the future. Finally, of particular importance is the nature of the interplay between the U.S. commitment to China's military modernization and China's support for U.S. security objectives in the Asia-Pacific region.

he United States has seemed to benefit from China's support for U.S. policies in Asia, for example:

  (1) China's support for the U.S. political and military presence in Northeast Asia ;

  (2) China's reduction of its support for revolutionary movements in Asia ;

  (3) China's help in limiting U.S. military requirements for countering the Soviet threat in the Asia-Pacific region ; and

  (4) China's collaboration with certain Differences in tension reduction and finding peaceful solutions for the Cambodian and Korean problems.

  But the Chinese have disagreed with the United states on some other important global and regional security issues, especially related to the Third World. The Chinese have continued to avoid irritating the Soviet Union, and continued to explore possibilities for rapprochement with the Soviets. China's role in facilitating American security objectives and missions in the Asia-Pacific region has proven very limited to intelligence gathering and sharing between the two countries. The Chinese do not permit and will not permit the United states to conduct military aircraft flights over china's airspace and to enjoy naval ship's basing rights at China's port in the foreseeable future.

  To summarize, a prospect of Sino-American security relations in the 1990s is that a key area of cooperation is functional service-to- service exchanges, while U.S. transfer of arms and technology to China will continue to meet Chinese defense requirements, especially in several military mission areas in ground, air, and naval forces of the People's Liberation Army(anti-tank, artillery, air defense, and antisubmarine warfare). This cooperation will help improve the PLA's capability gradually and modestly, not upgrade it rapidly.